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The prohibition of state aid to Investment and R&D in an integrated market 
such as the European Community is analysed in a Cournot oligopoly model 
where firms undertake investment or R&D to reduce their costs. Both strategic 
and non-strategic investment and R&D are considered. Governments in the 
member states give subsidies for investment and R&D, which are financed by 
distortionary taxation so the opportunity cost of government revenue exceeds 
unity. Prohibiting state aid to investment will always increase aggregate 
welfare. Prohibiting state aid to R&D will always increase aggregate welfare 
if spillovers from R&D are small. If spillovers from R&D are moderate then 
there exists a range of values for opportunity cost where governments give 
state aid and where the prohibition of state aid will increase aggregate welfare. 
Prohibiting state aid to R&D will reduce aggregate welfare if spillovers from 
R&D are large.  
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There has been scant attention paid to the economic analysis of state aid, and the 
rationale for the prohibition of state aid by the EC. My recent articles, Collie (2000, 2002a, 
2002b), using a symmetric oligopoly model, have attempted to provide a rationale for state 
aid that explains why countries give state aid and why the EC would prohibit state aid. For 
simplicity, these articles model state aid as production subsidies even though operating aid is 
not generally permitted under EC state aid policy. These articles show that the profit-shifting 
motive identified by Brander and Spencer (1985) will lead member states to give state aid to 
their firms. When taxation is not distortionary and products are homogeneous, the Nash 
equilibrium in production subsidies will lead to an outcome where price is equal to marginal 
cost. Such an outcome is Pareto-efficient as the subsidies expand the output of the Cournot 
oligopoly to the efficient level. A similar result is obtained by Norman and Venables (2004) 
in an economic geography model of industrial clusters where subsidies again lead to a Pareto 
efficient outcome. Collie (2000) shows that adding distortionary taxation, an opportunity cost 
of government revenue greater than one, in a Cournot oligopoly model provides a rationale 
for the prohibition of state aid. Collie (2002a) shows how the results can be extended to 
differentiated products and Bertrand oligopoly. If products are sufficiently differentiated then 
the prohibition of state aid will not be beneficial as the subsidies of one country will have 
little effect on the profits of firms in other countries but will increase consumer surplus. 
Collie (2002b) introduces foreign competition into the analysis. 
A criticism of these articles is that production subsidies are not permitted under EC state 
aid policy, and that subsides for investment and R&D are more relevant to actual state aid 
policy. Therefore, this paper extends the analysis to cover investment and R&D subsidies in a 
Cournot oligopoly model. Such subsidies are similar to production subsidies in that they 
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reduce the marginal cost of production but they do it by expending real resources on 
investment or R&D. The analysis will consider strategic investment (with no spillovers) and 





The model extends the analysis in Collie (2000, 2002a) by incorporating the investment 
or R&D decisions of firms, and introducing subsidies to investment or R&D given by the 
countries. For simplicity, the simplest possible functional forms will be employed such as 
linear demand and cost functions. There are M countries in an integrated market and it is 
assumed that in each country there is a single firm. The firms compete in a symmetric 
Cournot oligopoly where investment or R&D can be used to lower the marginal cost of 
production. Output of the ith firm is  i q  and its investment or R&D is  i x . Demand for the 
homogeneous product in the integrated market is given by the linear inverse demand 
function: 
Q   i
i
Pq α βα =− =− β ∑  (1) 
The firms can use investment or R&D to reduce the marginal cost of production. For 










 ∑  (2) 
where θ  is the cost reduction from investment or R&D, and φ  is a measure of the degree of 
spillovers from R&D, with 01 φ << . The cost of investment or R&D for the ith firm is 
quadratic: 
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2 2 ii rx σ =  (3) 
The government in the ith country gives state aid to its firm in the form of a subsidy,  , 
per unit of investment or R&D. Therefore, the profits of the ith firm are: 
i s
  ( )
2 2 ii i i Pcq x s x πσ =− − + i i  (4) 
Assuming that each country is only concerned about its own welfare, the welfare of the 
ith country is given by the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus less the cost of the 
subsidies. If raising the tax revenue to pay the subsidy involves imposing a deadweight loss 
on taxpayers then the opportunity cost of government revenue is greater than one,  1 λ > . 
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 (5) 
where (  is the deadweight loss from taxation.  ) 1 ii sx λ −
By definition, there are no spillovers from investment so  0 φ = , but there are spillovers 





=  (6) 
There are two approaches to modelling investment or R&D that have been used in the 
literature: 
Non-strategic investment or R&D: With non-strategic investment or R&D the firm sets 
i x  at the same time as setting output,  . In this case, the firms set investment or R&D to 
minimise the total cost of production. 
i q
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Strategic investment or R&D: With strategic investment or R&D the firm sets  i x  before 
it sets output,  . In this case, investment or R&D may give the firm a strategic advantage by 
reducing its costs before the other firms set their outputs, and thereby causing competitors to 
reduce their output. 
i q
In this paper, the first approach will be used to model R&D and the second approach will 
be used to model investment. These two approaches are shown in table one: 
Multi-Stage Game  Non-Strategic Strategic 
Stage One  Governments set investment 
or R&D subsidies. 
Governments set investment 
or R&D subsidies. 
Stage Two  Firms set output and 
investment or R&D given 
subsidies. 
Firms set investment or R&D 
given subsidies. 
Stage Three    Firms set output given 
investment or R&D. 
Table 1: Multistage Games 
 
3. Strategic Investment under Oligopoly 
Firstly, consider investment where there are no spillovers and the investment decision 
can be used strategically by the firms. As usual the multistage game is solved by backwards 
induction to obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. At the final stage of the game, the 
firms set their outputs given the investment undertaken at the second stage so the first-order 
conditions for the Cournot equilibrium are: 










=− − −+ =
∂
 (7) 
Solving for the Cournot equilibrium outputs yields: 














x ∑  (8) 
The effect of an increase of investment by the ith firm on the its output and the output of 
















<  (9) 
Investment by the ith firm increases its output and reduces the outputs of its competitors. 
Clearly, investment gives the firm a strategic advantage in the final stage of the game. 
At the second stage of the game, the firms make their investment decisions anticipating 
the effect that their investments will have on the Cournot equilibrium in the final stage of the 
game. Using (7), the profits of the ith firm can be written as: 
 
22 2 iii qx s πβ σ =− + i i x  (10) 
Hence, with each firm independently and simultaneously setting investment, the first-















Substituting (9) into the above and solving for the Nash equilibrium investments yields: 
  ()( ) ( )
2 22 1 1 j
i
i MAM M s M
x
A
s θ αµ β θ β −− + + + ∆
=
∆
∑  (12) 
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where   and  ()
2 2 12 MM βσ θ ∆≡ + − >0 ( )
2 12 AM M βσ θ 0 = +− >  provided the 
effectiveness of investment is not too large  ( )
2 12 M M ηθβ σ ≡< +, which ensures 
uniqueness/stability. The effects of an investment subsidy from the ith government on 




























The subsidy by the government in the ith country increases investment by its firm but 
reduces investment by firms in the other countries. Therefore, the investment subsidy gives 
the firm in the ith country a strategic advantage and shifts profits from the other countries to 
the ith country. 
Having obtained the Nash equilibrium investments and outputs, these can now be 
substituted into (5) to give welfare as a function of the subsidies in the first stage of the game 
when the governments set subsidies. The first-order conditions for the Nash equilibrium can 
be solved to get the symmetric Nash equilibrium subsidies and welfare: 










Since the algebraic expression for the Nash equilibrium subsidy is very complicated, the 
results will be shown using numerical solutions in graphs. As the opportunity cost of 
government revenue increases the cost of using an investment subsidy increases and the Nash 
equilibrium subsidy will decrease until, for the critical value of opportunity cost 
S λ , it is 
equal to zero. The critical value of opportunity cost, 
S λ , such that the Nash equilibrium 
subsidy is equal to zero is defined by  ( ) 0
NS s λ ≡ . Figure 1 shows that as the number of 
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countries/firms increases then the Nash equilibrium subsidy decreases as the profit margin 
and hence the incentive for strategic profit-shifting is reduced. Consequently, as shown in 
figure 2, the critical value of opportunity cost will decrease as the number of countries/firms 
increases. It can be shown that welfare is always higher when subsidies are prohibited than in 
the Nash equilibrium in subsidies, 
P N W > W . Figure 3 shows that as the effectiveness of 
investment increases then the Nash equilibrium subsidy increases as the investment subsidy 
has a greater strategic effect. Consequently, as shown in figure  4, the critical value of 
opportunity cost is increasing in the effectiveness of investment. These results lead to the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The prohibition of state aid to investment will increase the welfare of all 
countries. 
When state aid to investment is allowed, the result is a subsidy war where governments 
use subsidies to give their firms a strategic advantage but the result is a prisoners’ dilemma 
where all governments are worse off than if state aid was prohibited. The firms will over-
invest in the Cournot oligopoly so the subsidies to investment will exacerbate this over-
investment. Note that this result holds when the opportunity cost of government revenue is 
equal to one so lump-sum taxes are available whereas in Collie (2000) the outcome would be 
Pareto-efficient in this case as the production subsidies would drive price equal to marginal 
cost. The reason is that investment subsidies use real resources to reduce marginal cost but 
this is not the case with a production subsidy. From the point of view of economic efficiency, 
in contrast to EC state aid policy, a production subsidy may be superior to an investment 
subsidy. 
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When there are no spillovers from investment, the prohibition of state aid will increase 
welfare, but with spillovers from R&D there may be a case to allow state aid, and this will be 
considered in the next section. 
 
4. Non-Strategic R&D under Oligopoly 
The analysis of R&D with spillovers will assume that it is non-strategic so as to reduce 
the complexity of the problem. As usual the multistage game is solved by backwards 
induction for the subgame perfect equilibrium. The firms are assumed to set output and R&D 
simultaneously and independently in the final stage of the game given the R&D subsidies set 

























Summing these first-order conditions over all the firms yields the Nash equilibrium 
aggregate output and R&D: 
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The R&D subsidy increases the total amount of R&D and increases total output, which 
also increases total R&D. These can then be used to solve for the Nash equilibrium output 
and R&D of each firm: 
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Having obtained the Nash equilibrium investments and outputs, these can now be 
substituted into (5) to give welfare as a function of the subsidies in the first stage of the game. 
The first-order conditions for the Nash equilibrium can be solved to get the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium subsidies and welfare: 









∂ ) , ,  (18) 
The Nash equilibrium R&D subsidy is a function of the opportunity cost of government 
revenue,  λ ; the degree of spillovers, φ ; the effectiveness of R&D, η ; and the number of 
countries/firms, M . As with investment, there is a critical value of the opportunity cost, 
S λ , 
such that the Nash equilibrium R&D subsidy is zero so  ( ) 0
NS s λ ≡ . The Nash equilibrium 
R&D subsidy will be positive (negative) when the opportunity cost is less (greater) than the 
critical value, 
S λ . 
Welfare when state aid is prohibited can be obtained by setting the R&D subsidies of all 
countries equal to zero to obtain: 
P W , while welfare in the Nash equilibrium in R&D 
subsidies is given by: W ()
N λ . There is a critical value of opportunity cost, 
P λ , such that 
welfare in the Nash equilibrium is equal to welfare when state aid is prohibited, 
. Welfare when state aid is prohibited will be greater (less) than welfare in the 
Nash equilibrium if the opportunity cost of government revenue is greater (less) than the 
critical value of opportunity cost, 
()
NP W λ ≡
P W
P λ . 
Again given the complexity of the algebraic expressions, the results will be presented 
using numerical solutions shown in graphs. Figure  5 shows the Nash equilibrium R&D 
subsidy as a function of the degree of spillovers and it can be seen that the subsidy is 
decreasing in spillovers when spillovers are small and increasing when spillovers are large. 
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Initially, spillovers reduce the strategic advantage obtained from an R&D subsidy but when 
the spillovers are large the gain to consumers becomes the dominant factor. Figure 6 shows 
how the critical values of opportunity cost vary with the degree of spillovers. It can be seen 
that 
S λ  is decreasing in the degree of spillovers whereas 
P λ  is increasing in the degree of 
spillovers. When the degree of spillovers is low,  00 5 φ < ⋅  in the graph, welfare when state 
aid is prohibited is always greater than welfare in the Nash equilibrium. When the degree of 
spillovers is moderate, 00 5 01 4 φ ⋅< < ⋅ in the graph, welfare when state aid is prohibited is 
greater (less) than welfare in the Nash equilibrium if opportunity cost is greater than 
P λ , 
which is increasing in the degree of spillovers. When the degree of spillovers is large, 
01 4 φ >⋅  in the graph, welfare when state aid is prohibited is less than welfare in the Nash 
equilibrium. These results lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Prohibiting state aid to R&D will always increase aggregate welfare if 
degree of spillovers from R&D is low. If the degree of spillovers from R&D is moderate then 
there exists a range of values for opportunity cost where governments give state aid and 
where the prohibition of state aid will increase aggregate welfare. Prohibiting state aid to 
R&D will reduce aggregate welfare if the degree of spillovers from R&D is large. 
When the spillovers from R&D are small, as with investment where there are no 
spillovers, the prohibition of state aid will increase welfare whatever the opportunity cost of 
government revenue. When spillovers from R&D are large, the prohibition of state aid will 
reduce welfare whatever the opportunity cost of government revenue. In both cases, the 
policy implications are clear. However, when spillovers from R&D are moderate, whether the 
prohibition of state aid will increase or decrease welfare will depend upon the opportunity 
cost of government revenue. 
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Figure 7 shows that the Nash equilibrium R&D subsidy increases as the effectiveness of 
R&D increases, and figure 8 shows that the range of values for opportunity cost where the 
prohibition of state aid is beneficial increases as the effectiveness of R&D increases. Figure 9 
shows that the Nash equilibrium subsidy decreases as the number of countries/firms 
increases, and figure 10 shows that the range of values where the prohibition of state aid is 
beneficial decreases as the number of countries/firms increases. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has extended the analysis of Collie (2000, 2002a) to consider investment and 
R&D subsidies rather than production subsidies, as operating aid is not generally permitted 
under EC state aid policy whereas state aid to investment and R&D is permitted. Obviously, 
this required the analsysis to be extended to cover the investment or R&D decisions of the 
firms. It has been shown that the prohibition of state aid to investment (where there are no 
spillovers) will increase welfare. Similarly, the prohibition of state aid to R&D where 
spillovers are low will increase welfare. When spillovers to R&D are moderate, whether the 
the prohibition of state aid to R&D will increase or decrease welfare depends upon the 
opportunity cost of government revenue. The prohibition of state aid will always reduce 
welfare when the spillovers from R&D are sufficiently large. 
The analysis in this paper could be extended in a number of ways that may affect the 
results. Firstly, adding product differentiation may imply that the prohibition of state aid will 
not be beneficial when products are sufficiently differentiated as shown in Collie (2002a) for 
production subsidies. Secondly, with Bertrand rather than Cournot oligopoly the strategic 
incentives for investment or R&D may be altered but it should be noted that Bagwell and 
Staiger (1994) have shown that the argument for R&D subsidies is not generally affected by 
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whether there is Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly unlike the argument for export subsidies, see 
Eaton and Grossman (1986). Therefore, introducing Bertand oligopoly as in Collie (2002a) 
may not affect the results in any qualitative way. 
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Figure 10: Critical values of opportunity cost vs number of countries/firms